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President Fortson, Fellow Members of Reserve Officers Association
and Guests:
It is always a pleasure to me
to talk with mern[bers of th.:i
Reserve Officers Association, an.I
to attend one of orur meetings.
I am always inspired by ihe great
tradition of the citizen-soldier,
for it is one of the !finest traditions in the American way o.f
life. 'fhis illustrious tradition
comprises one of the secrets o,f
Americ-a's greatness--;we are not
a warlike nation, hu.t we ·under:;:tand the need for defending :)Ur
land and our 1g reat principles.
General Bradh,y, the •Chief of
the Joint ICihiefs of Staff, has said
that the keystone of ,our national
security is an interested, strong,
and hard~working Reserve. He
knows whereof he speaks, for
we remember that in World War
II, 98 per cent of those who
f1ornght for the United States were
either dvilians or members of the
Reserve.
Members of the Reserve Officers Association are particularly
valuable to our nation because
they have ,both the civilian and
the military points O'f view. They
know and understand the techniral problell11S of modern warfari:,
but at the same time they ran
approach those problems from the
viewpoint of the civilian.
For these reasons, ,o,ur assodation need have no hesitation in
standing up for the rights O'f thg
Reserve.
To reach a high degree of readiness and efficiency within our
reserve ,c omponents, and to insure a feeling· 0 1f seH-confidence
and a high order of morale on
the part o-f' the individual reser.,
vi:,t, is the objective of orur assodati(,Yl and most certainly the
<lesire of the regular military establishments. Yet the treatment
accorded reserves is not alwa)S
equitable, as based upon ·Nell
thou:g ht 01ut planning. I sincerely
feel that todav the reserve is
resnected 'by those in tne +,op
military posts and great stride'>

have already been made toward
a sound and workable reserve
program. It is to be regretted,
however, that the thinking on
some level~ fo still permeated by
the Gld philosophy that a professional soldier is, !by virtue of
his training·, superior to his civiian counterpa1-t when foe latter
is recalled to active duty, and
should take precedence in man7
ways. I refer here to the confused rmanner in which the recent
recall program has .been conducted; to the very loiw ratio of rf)serve pr01IDdions as 1compared t·.l
th '.)Se cJJ regular offi,cers in riu
same ,i~rad•.'; to •he minute num,
Lcr c,f ::,•u,or eT:>de reservists re ..
called nnd to the ban on res.e rves.,
al'.hough ~vfll qualified, to hold
command billets especially true in
the Navy. There exists also the
in<>qnitable distribution orf, aad
rotation in, more fav,oraible billet<;, The fta,g rant discrimination:;
tnward n:;erve offi-cers in application of the present retirem'ent
law is an
il that must be cor•:ected.
It should b'e a matter orf pride
and satisfaction to you, as members, that the Reserve Officer,;
Association by dogged <lete,rmination and persistence dul'ing the
past. year has caused corrective
· steps b be initiated by the Departrn ent ,o f Defense an.,l the !'Cspective military esta,blishment
toward r~cUfying these many
mistakes.
However, we, as an Assodation. must continue to fight, and
fight hard, for a reserve policy
that will give the members of oul'
Reserve components a :feeling of
i:.elf assurance and uride that will
enable the,rn to discharge their
individual responsibilities o:f duty,
who,ever necessary, in a mUitary
and efficient !manner, anrl, as the
nation's :first line of defense, insure a strong national defense.
At the same time, it is our ohligation and duty to wor:-c constantly to improve our own mili.-

e,

tary knowledge
and abilities
against the time when our ,cour.try ,w ill need them. We should
re.member that the stated purpose oJ the 'R . O. A. is "to suvport a military policy for the
United States that !Will provide
adequate national security, an,!
to assist in the development and
exec·ution thereof."
TO'ward that end, perhaps it
will be worthwhile tonight Lo
think for a few minutes about
the broad pro:iilerr. of promoting
our national security. If we can
clarify O'ur own thinkin_g- a,hout
the ,c ritkal pr()ble:ms America
fares, our own contribution t()ward their solution will be so
much g reater.
In an eff.crt to
bring
the
picture into sharper focus, I have
jotted down :five
outstanding
points which iI believe should re··
present the major aims O'f the
United States
at
this
time.
A.gains~ each 01J' these aims we
can test o·ur p1iogress in the difficult months ahead.
The first o:f these is that AmP.rica ,m ust
face
Comm1U111;;,m
squarely ·w ith all our mig·ht, and
on a global basis. Throu~hout b1c
world today the relative strength
of the Communists is being measured a,2:ainst that of the AntiGomm:1~ists. There is a confr1uing process of probe and counter-probe to determine wea1;: areas
into which Communists can move.
When the Reds ifind a weak area,
it is :merely a .matter of time 1mtil they pounce upon it. Korea
was one of those areas, and the
Reds ,moved in, believin<Y, thev
·c ould take it over short o,f actual
war.
We must therefore recognizi1
clearly that the Soviets will spread
their tentades into everv corner
o i' the world if we do 110t meet
them everywhere they turn. In
opposing: this greedy desire for
world domination, America cannot avoid full responsible leadership. We are the stron~est nation
in the .f ree worlr!, and c.nr duty
to hunnanity is dear. Our desire
should ,continue to be to stop
Comrnunism short oif war, but
stop it we .must, whatever it

ta:.rns to do the job.
It is no1w clear that Russhi':,;
principal pod~war aims are to
dominate Japan and Ge:rmany-the two countries most prostrated
by World War II. These two danger spots, therefore, should receive our closest attention. AntiComrr nunist movements in thl1se
and all other places, especially
those behind the iron curtain.
should receive our utmost en:
couragement and assistance. We
must budget our aid to free nations on the l:asis of how far they
are willing te go to fight Communism. Those nations who open
their doors to Russian influenM
should rind the doors o,f the United States dosed to them.
There you have the first important thing
to
rem~miber-Comrmunism is our enemy, and
we must mett and defeat it.
The second thing we have to
fare is the necessity for full and
complete mobilization oJ our military gtren~h. We ,c an no longe:·
afford to drift along as we unfortunately did for several years
after the .Japanese armistice was
l"igned. The hour 1for complacency
is loner past, whether it be found
in officialdom or in the mind of
the man on the street. '!'he present danger demands that we be
armed Vi the teeth and ready.
Working toward full Tr.obilirntion, one of the thin,~·s we need
to do is to inaugurate military
training. This ·will not ol'ly help
to ans;wer our ,crying need for
trained men, but it is the best
thing for th~ welfare of l·Ur boys.
They live in a dangerous worlda v;C'rld which may ask them to
risk their livts at any tin~e. It is
rne1·elv realistic and sensible to
provide them with the lmow-hcmv
to m~ke wa1· and still keep on
livin,<?,·.
The next thing we need in
mobilizing military strenrgth is
all-out production of materiel. W v
must have modern weapons--guns, tanks, planes, shins, and
all the myriad items that must
follo,v in the wa[~e O'f the 1fightin1~
men. 'l'his means l'Otund-the-clock
production in industry, and it
means an industrial mobilization

geared up to wartime needs.
There :will be sacrifices along the
line to bring this about, but ·we
cannot build our national security without it.
We must Rtrengthen every arm
of our fightin,g forces and weld
them into ,closely cooperating
military machines. For instance,
I do not think the present aim for
a 95-group Air Force is sufficient,
for I think the growth of Russian air power is su·c h as to dc:>11and that wE: build an Air Force
possible
reaching
15 0-or-m ')re
groups. Similarly, we need a more
effective /merchant maime, recalling that ,o ur vast collection
of ships in World War II diverted
Hitler to an all-out concentration
on si.:ibnarine warfare, ,and that
our ships ::mpported our tfo1·ces
on many fa!' flung battlefront~
:md ,beach-heads which could
never have been held without the
supplies and eq1iip,m ent
whicn
they kept moving in a steady
flow.
To guard against a third world
war, we must concentrate more
heavily on an adequate system
of stockpiling of strategic materials. In this connection, the single
catalogue system supported 1Jy
many military men should be
g-iven consideration as a means
of simplifying pro·c ure.ment and
avoiding the red tape which is a
continual handicap.
We must push the develop,men~
oi new and more effective military uses for atomic weapons,
our greatest sin.q;le asset today.
Our atomic bombs are r,ot only
r!lttlin,:,: shutters in Nevada, but
are cJ'\usin!! shudders in the Kremlin. Thus they are both potential
weapom for t·he ;f1uture, and psychological weapons here and ll()IW,
The a1.om1ic bomb, in.cidentaliy,
has !'aiiicallv changed global mni-tary strategy. 'Heavy corn:_entrations of men are too dangerous
now with the rislk of terrible
l'asualties frorm such a boimh.
Smaller
and
more
bcatterecl
group s are made desirable. Thi~
meam; that
have a better opJ.,ortm,ity of eounterin,g- the Co,"Y'munists militarily on a 1!lobal
hasis. Tactical ·u:,e of the A-bo1mb

,H,

will thus help to make mere practical the defonse ()If Ji:urnpe witl1
reasonable numoers of men.
At the sa:ne time, we shoul,1
loo:< to our own defenses against
the A-bomb. Russia is 'Working
furiously to catch up with us, anrt
every clay that passes lessens our
advantage in this respect. For
this reason, we rmust haive an
adequate radar i,creen to protect
the North American continent,
coupled with the best available
interceptor aiiicra1ft always on the
alert. Down en the civilian level,
we must push to its conclusion
our pref-\ent plan for civil defense.
Every citizen in A.Jmerica should
be alei·tecl to his responsibilities
in the event o>f an enemy attack.
To hack up all-out mobilizati:rn
of ,o ur material power, we shoru ld
concentrate E-ver more heavily on
our program of
psychological
warfare. No one can say just
how effectiv::i this program may
he in staving off anothH global
war. 'l'he story
of A..merica'.1
strength . and of our dedication
to the rights of free men shot.lJ
somehow be spread inb all the
world. The iron ,c urtain can be
penetrated, and when it is the
truth ,will hurt the cause o,f Communism.
The
third
,major
p!Urpose
Americ:a should have in mind is
to ovganize the whole fn,e world
against Communism. Thus far we
have neglected some of the opportunities in lining up our
friends against our enemies-an·i
we're going
to need
all the
friends we can get if :worst co.mes
to worst.
The North American Treaty Alliance is a move in that direction.
We should fortify it by bringin 6
in Turkey, Greece, Spain, and
Yugoslavia. With regard to Spain,
we shculd recall that Comrm,unism got a ,b ad licking there. We
now have an ambassador in Madrid, and we should lbe consistent
by assuring for o,ur nation and
its
allies 1.he
psychologically
strategic asset of militarily unified western Europe, as well as
the strategi.:! advanta,g e ,ocf the
I,herian Peninsula, which has
played sruch an important role in

great ~nilitary operations od' European history.
In the Pacific, we can make a
Pacific Alliance whkh will be
eq;rnlly as effective as the North
Atlantic Alliance m Eu.r ope. Our
diplomats should push hard for
an ea£1y Japanese peace treaty,
as a prerequisite to this goal. .Japan ean be a 8trong bulwark in a
Pacific Alliance, and :J, limited
rearmair..ent program should he
allow(,d for the J ap ..mese. J apan's present attitudes should be
co,unted at this h cur, not the Japanese attitudes of a d eca de ag0
which have passed as an ignoUe
chapter in her history. Indonesia also should be sought as a
part ,of the free rworld'·, Pacific
netwo1·'.,, since France has now
granted her complete freedom.
All these and many other moves
can and shodd be rmade in organizing every nation now free o'f
COirnmunis,m into a "last world
brntherhood d edicated to the proposition that the Red desire for
world denomination can be defeated.
The fourth thin1g- we need to
do is to w'n the ~var in Kon•a,
and win it ;l:J quickly as we can.
Alt.hou,g,h the situation in Korea has been precarious at times,
it has !treatly improved within
the last few days and I sincerely
believe that our army in Korea
and its allies ,can d€!feat China
within a reascnable time. All reports from the battlefr,:,nts indicate that our troops are doirc~
fin(', with high morale prevalent.
'l' he :::trategy of General Ridge'\vay-fast-moving cmr.,bat te,,rns
to flush out the enemy and then
knocking him out from the airappears to be worldng. Ridgeway's poli'cy, v.hich is to kill Chin ese and kill a lot of 1hen1. is
havin~ its eifect. It is true t1,at
thousands of our lboys are giving ·
their lives, and ac,c·ording to information rc;eased recently our
b'attle casualties alone to date
have amounted to wbout 145,000.
Their rncrificu. is f,or the camse of
world peace, and 01ur prayern
$honld constantly be that they
ha'.'e 11ot died in vain.
In pursuing our aims in Korea,
we must adhere to a -;trict and

severe poHcy in dealing with the
Chinese. !Red IC:hina should be
[{ept out of the United Natior.s
at all costs. She should be told
that there will never be a ceasefire order on Chinese terms. Sh<=
must get out oif Korea and be
held accountable for her ag,gression. A full embm,g10, such as the
United Nations has proposed,
should be imposed upon her. Red
China should never be allowed
to get her hands on the Islanci
of Fol'.mosa, which is a key point
in our proposals to defend th,~
Pacifi,: .
K01·ea is concrete evidence that
the Ru ssians will ·use their military might in their scheme to
enslave the 1wor}d. F 'o r a long
time many people thought the
Reds would stick to ordinary propaJTanda methods and to infiltration from within. Korea has
ciiangc'd theit thinking .. We must
no,v face th,3 possibility that Russia may ,come into the Korea:1
fi;i;ht not only with materiel but
with men . They can do it in a
huny if they want to. A quick
decision by a few men woruld do
the tric1,. That is a possibility wo
must 1·eme111ber at all times.
.As you may knoiw, the Chinese.
leader Mao Ti,e-Tung- suffers from
a ,had heart 1condition. There is
a chance that this illness will
ta'.rn him out otf the eNar. H that
happens, !Russia :m11.y be forced
to senrl one of their top genern ls
to Korea to avoid the chance o•.f a
split-up amono; the je:llous generals around Mao.
A good many people still ask
the 011estion: Why are we fig:1tin9: in Korea? To me, the answer
is o!bvious. A great principle is ,it
stake on the bloody soil of thnt
little-known land. There, :for the
first time on any l:n,~;e scale, the
free nations .o f the wv::ld are
taking- collective action to resiEt
armed ag,e;re,;sion. That is a sfo;nificant devdopment in the his,
tory of man[<ind, and it augurn
weil for man's future.
Korea is important to us 'ls a
testing- ground to show the world
th,...t -::1·pe men are stron~er, morally and materially,
than
tlie
1Comr1:unists. As I said ibefore,
Korea was one of the places in

whtch the Reds felt that a sbte
of weakness invited aggression.
Thev moved into the Peninsula
!bc>lieving that it could be taken
short of large-scale war, and that
it would serve as a striking example to the rest of the Asiatfo
world that Communism was to be
the guiding fa1ctor in that area.
Some people believe that this was
the worst error ol.f judgement
Stalin has made in recent yean.
From the standpoint of the United States there could hardly have
been a better place for him to
strike. The Peninsula afforderl a
maximum opportunity for our
powerful 'Navy to operate in deep
water. The narrow space confined land operations to a rdatively
~mall area, and it was fairly close
to Japan whne we had our best
concentrations of m·e n and materiel, with a n,asonably short striking distance of our air m,m.
With the preponderance O·f
manpower in the hands of the
Reds, it became a proposition '>tt
tradin.~ space for lives. Withdrawing orderly, but quickly, to
avoid encirclement, our force.~
presrved their integrity imd their
strength. Throughout the Ion~
withdrawal from the Manchurian
borde1·, United Nations -losse3
were comparatively light. Th<:!
.Chinese Red losses on the -other
hand were extremely heavy, pflrtirularly those that have been inflicted by air power.
The first Chinese counter attack was due in no small part to
the fad that we had no recon:i.igsanC'e by air, and this was
limiter] to the air over Korea.
General MacArthur took a calculated risk against an approximate 107,000 North Koreans
and Chinese. Unfortunately the
intention of 1China to intervene
was miscalculated, and cur boys
were attacked by 200,000 troop>!.
Jt was known that the ifourth
Chinese army ,w as in Manchuria,
and that another rfo11ce numhering some one million men was in
Manchuria available for ·use in
Korea. As United Nations forces
were withdrc1.wn from tbe Manehurian border to avoid encir.:lement, it had a secondary effect,

of extreme importance to our
forces, that od' extendin;:
'lte
enemy's lines. This reversed the
degree of vulnernbility o.f the opposing forces and exp0~ed the
Chinese communications to our.
air _power. It is of interest to note
that the logistical requiremenb1
for th,, :clhim:se troops is only 5 0
tons per day per divisi,m, while
the 'United Nations forces require six times this a.."tlount or
about 300 tons per division per
day. Yet our superiority in materiel and equipment has made
our comparatively light forces
most effective in the comhat.
These are things to think about
as w~ study the effort of our
forces to hu1·l back the latest and
most ·vicious attack cxf the Communists in Korea.
The fifth and last point I want
to mention is the necessity for
getting our own house in 3h'ipe
here a~ ltome.
We .cann0t overlook th;i continuing threat .) f Co=m;sts in
our government, our industry,
our research laboratories, and in
other stategic American situations. These sons of Stalin must
be weeded out and piteously ex;posed, and we must deport or
imprist'n all conspirators. They
are just as dangerous to us a::s
Russian weapons in Korea .
In the mattc>r of our internal
economy, we have not yet taken
all the stepa necessary to prevent
the further ;nf!ation tha1' is in
the offinv.. Evory historia1~ recognizes the fact that inflation
has been an effective destroyer of
vovernments. It is almost as destructive in the respect as war
itself. Since the start of the Korean war we have witriessed a
sharp rise in the cost of living.
Steps l1ave been taken, but they
nre net, enou.gh.
To mak~ i, strong America w,i
need a strong set of leaders on
the home front. I believe the
time has come when me must
develop a code of ethics sufficient
to put a stop to criminal or semicriminal activities in high places.
The Tecord of recent years in
\Vashingtnn is not a source o.f
pride to the American people.

Above all, the ordinary citizen
on the street must be given a
new sense of the danger he is in.
We must have a citizenry alert
and united if we are to be ,mccessf.nl in our global efforts to
defeat Communism. When the
American is aroused, he is a
great fighter and a g1·eat producer. We need to arouse him,
and arouse him now.
'l'hus we see the fiv1 gl'Cat
causes .hat we must ma;:P. "ur
,,wn pm-;· c Si"S as Reserve Officer'!
and as citizens: Facing Com·
miunism squarely and realistical•
ly: completing full mob~lization
of our strength; orgamzmg our
friend:; the world ove1· against
the Reds; winning the hattle for
freedom of Korea; and putting
our own house in order here at
home.
As we proceed on this great
·undertaking, there are many
signs that will ibe successf.ul.

There
are
indications
that
the
,Communist
scheme
is
beginning to lose out. Some of
these m·e: the great strides Ger.era} •E isenhower has made with
the Atlantic Pact defense mo,yement; the split-up among Communists in F'rance and Italy; the
continued solidarity Oi:f the United States and Great Britain in
the United Nations; tho fears
aroused in Russia by the spread
of Titaism; and the failures IYf
Russia to make good use IYf the
United Nations as a sounding
board for their policies.
There are discouraging things,
too, anti we will have many more
discouragements in the future.
But we cannot afford to let them
stop us. Today, as never befol'•~,
Americans must devote their
thoughts, actions, and their very
lives to the cause IYf freedom
throughout the world.

